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CAUSES FOR MILITARY DESERTION; A STUDY
IN CRIMINAL TMOTIVES
E. N. WOODBURY'
[We have the privilege of presenting here a remarkable study in
criminal motives, one of the few of its kind ever made, and an example
of that kind of study which must be the basis of a reconstructed
criminal law.
Modern criminal science has thus far neglected completely this
field of analysis. One reason probably is that the psychologists culti-
vating criminal science have been concerned chiefly with the patho-
logical and abnormal side of its psychology. Another reason is that
the psychologists are so little agreed on a scientific classification of
motives that they hesitate to commit themselves to any one classifica-
tion as the basis of a scientific study; they are made timid by their
science; yet others can "rush in where angels fear to tread" without
being rash.
But the most important reason for the lack of such studies is that
the data in our civilian crime records are virtually non-existent, and
such a study is feasible only by enormous expenditure of time and
money. The disgraceful and shocking fact of civilian justice is that it
keeps no records of the facts of crime. This pernicious and shameful
neglect I have already pointed out, in its contrast with military justice,
in my article on "Some Lessons to Be Learned From Military Justice"
(JOURNAL, X, 2, 170 ff.). A general court-martial keeps a complete
stenographic report of all proceedings, including testimony; a civilian
court keeps only a note of the charge and the verdict. This deficiency
is to blame for most of our slowness in getting at the facts of crime,
including causes, motives and remedies. We'do not know why crimes
are committed; therefore we are incapable of adapting our remedies to
the causes, either generically or individually.
In the military system these records can be studied and generalized.
Towards the close of the war, Col. E. L. Munson, formerly of the
Medical Corps, now chief of the Morals Branch, General Staff, deter-
mined to undertake a study of the causes of military offenses, with a
view to preventive measures. The offense of desertion was selected
for a beginning. The study was carried out by Major E. N. Wood-
'Major, C. A., U. S. A.
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bury, of the Coast Artillery 'Corps, and is now available for private
circulation in manuscript form. Doubtless it will some day be printed
in entirety. But owing to its value as an example of sound method,
permission was obtained by the Editors of the JOURNAL, from Major-
General Haan, Director of the War Plans Division, General Staff, for
publication of that portion dealing with Causes of Desertion.
The entire study is in 6 parts, copiously illustrated with graphs.
Part 1 deals with the crimne rate of desertion since 1830. Part 2 com-
pares enlistments and desertions. Part 3 studies the relation between
desertion and punishment and between causes of desertion and other
offenses. Part 4 compares desertion with the labor turnover in civil
industry. Part 5 studies conditions of discipline in relation to deser-
tion, seeking to disclose the factors of locality, personnel and methods
in their relative influence. Part 6 inquires into the Causes for Deser-
tion. This Part 6, with a portion of Part 3, was selected for publica-
tion here as having greater general interest; but for its complete sig-
nificance, of course, the remainder of the entire study would have to be
taken into consideration.
JOHN H. WIGMORE.]
CAUSES OF DtsERTION AS DtETERMINED BY PXEVEW OF RECORDS OF
GENERAL COURTS-MARTIAL
1. It is believed that the best method of determination of the
relative value of the causes of desertion may be found by review of
the records of General Courts-Martial for cases involving desertion and
absence without leave. Although no comprehensive compilation has
been made of the causes of crime in the service, it is believed that
valuable information may be obtained by study of a brief compilation
made from 6,811 records of General Courts-Martial, of which the
cause has been recorded in 3,363 cases.
2. Of the 3,363 cases mentioned above, there are 663 cases of
desertion and 625 cases of absence without leave. The 3,363 cases
have been divided into four general groupings as follows:
(a) Connected with the Character of the Offender, total 2,015,
of which 252 cases are for desertion and 247 absence without leave.
(b) Connected with the Service, total" 769, of which 141 are for
desertion and 160 for absence without leave.
(c) Connected with Family Matters, total 369, of which 131 are
for desertion and 186 for absence without leave.
(d) Connected with Matters Outside the Army, total 86, of which
39 are cases of desertion and 24 absence without leave.
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3. In order to classify these 3,363 cases more in detail, it is pos-
sible to divide 2,713 of these cases into 14 groupings shown on Chart
No. 16 in the relative frequency of causes. The composition of each
of the fourteen groups is as follows: (a) Drink and drug addiction;
(b) Mental deficiency or weakness, including mental weakness, degen-
eracy, ignorance, the established criminal and criminal instinct;
(c) Discipline, including failure to understand reasons for discipline,
fear of punishment for other offenses, failure to appreciate seriousness
of offense, and lack of discipline; (d) Illness or physical overtax,
including illness, physical weakness, fatigue from unknown cause, and
fatgue from excessive duty; (e) Weakness of character, including
character weakness, instability, irresponsibility, youth and wanderlust;
(f) Illness of near relative; (g) Dissatisfaction with treatment, includ-
ing belief of unjust treatment, dissatisfaction with medical treatment,
failure to obtain transfer or discharge, manner of order, military causes
provoking, nature of order, failure to carry out enlistment promises,
poor handling by officers, and refusal of furlough; (h) Dissatisfaction
with environment, including dissatisfaction with organization, discon-
tent with station, conditions out of control, friction with noncommis-
sioned officers, general dislike of service, racial difficulty, and unpopu-
larity with associates; (i) Homesickness; (j) Poverty of dependents;
(k) Lack of loyalty; (1) Entanglement with women; (m) Cowardice;
(n) Desire to marry.
4. On Chart No. 16, above mentioned, will be found under each
group the proportion in cases of desertion and the proportion in cases
of absence without leave and the remainder. It will be seen that but
5 per cent of the cases found due to drink or drugs resulted in deser-
tion. Mental deficiency and mental weakness is shown as the largest
cause of desertion, and drink or drugs the largest causes of absence
without leave. Those crimes included in "other offenses" are Escape
(122), Disrespedt and disobedience (422), Solely military offenses
(92), Offenses with violence involved (451), Dishonesty (417),
Offenses by sentinels or guards (164), Offenses against decency (72),
and Miscellaneous offenses (15).
5. In order to determine the relative frequency with which the
most numerous causes may be expected to occur, Chart No. 17 has
been made, to indicate that which may be expected to cause the ma-
jority of enlisted men to desert or go absent without leave. The chart
is based on 1,000 men, and may be seen to show that, e. g., out of one
thousand deserters there should be 184 who deserted due to mental
weakness or deficiency and 32 who deserted because of homesickness.
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Chart No. I.
2,713 most frequent causes of Crime as found by review of 3363
Records of General Courts artial in which causes were determined.
Drink or Drug Addiction 1193 Cases,
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Illness or physical overtax, 153 Cases
Weakness of Character, 146 Cases
Illness of near relative, 143 Cases
Dissatisfa tion with treatment, 138 Cases
Dissatisfaction with environment, 98 Cases
Homesickness, 68 Cases
Poverty of dependents, 64 Cases
Lack of Loyalty, 59 Cases
Entanglement with women, 46 Cases
Cowardice, 40 Cases
Desire to marry, 34 Cases
0I.
Other Offenses
kNvM: The divisons mal u in . u represent that
proportion where the finding was Desertion; EM for




Relative frequency of the most numerous causes, where cause
is determined, of desertion and absence without leave, which
may be expected for 1,000 convictions of each offense.
DRINK OR DRUG ADDICTION:
Desertion,74 oases
Absence without Leave, 20L cases
MENTAL DEFICIENCY OR WEAKNESS:
Desertion, 184 cases
A.W.O.L., 80 cases
















The six principal causes include approximately sixty per cent of deser-
tions and eighty per cent of men who have gone seriously absent with-
out leave.
6. In connection with Chart No. 17, it is of interest to note that
drink causes the majority of absence without leave, whereas drink
causes comparatively little desertion. It will be seen that weakness of
mind and weakness of character cause a large proportion of desertion,
but not absence without leave. The largest figure for desertion not
included on this chart is dissatisfaction with environment, which, of
one thousand men, causes 68 desertions and but 21 men to go absent
without leave.
7. It is of interest to note that excessive drink has an influence
on desertion and absence without leave, although the period covered by
these records was that in which it was contrary to law to sell intoxi-
cants to men in uniform, March, 1919, to March, 1920. It is believed
that the difficulty in the procurement of intoxicants will reduce these
figures on later compilations.
8. In the consideration of the above statistics the fact must be
remembered that no definite proportion may be gained from the review
of so few cases. It is the opinion of the writer that the best informa-
tion possible may be obtained from the study of records of Courts-
Martial in every command.
SUMMATION OF CAuSES OF DESERTION
1. In the previous chapters of this study an attempt has been
made to show the influence of some of the most tangible causes of
desertion. From the previous chapters it may be seen how complex
are the influences affecting desertion. It should be kept in mind that
this study has been made from., conditions occurring in the past, and
that there may be a number of entirely new conditions arising in the
future with new results. It is therefore believed that the study of
desertion is thus a continuous -study; every organization commander
will be confronted with new combinations and problems in the handling,
of desertions.
2. In general, the statement is correct that desertion occurs when
the "pull outward" exceeds the "pull inward." There are some cases
of desertion where the individual may be said to get a "push outward"
due to his unpopularity, and again there are often cases of men who
would desert but for the public attitude against slackers and deserters
(as during the European War), or a family influence, which may be
termed a "push inward."
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3. Due to the fact that an organization commander seldom has
the opportunity of questioning a deserter, it becomes necessary to
determine the cause of desertion in another manner. This may be
done by careful study of the causes of absence without leave and study
of the causes of failure to re-enlist.
4. In order to cut down the rate of desertion in any organization
it is necessary for the organization commander to study each individual
in the organization, promptly to locate and remedy any adverse condi-
tions at the station or within the command, and to search out and
improve such conditions without the command which cause discontent
to the individual or entire command.
5. It is necessary, in the study of the individuals of an organiza-
tion, to pay especial attention to men found to be:
Mentally deficient or ignorant;
Irresponsible, yourig, unstable or easily influenced;
Addicted to drugs or excessive use of intoxicants;
Physically weak, ill or physically deficient;
Degenerate or of weak character;
Of known bad or criminal civil record;
Discontented, disgruntled or homesick;
Gambling excessively, winning or losing by gambling;
In financial difficulty, due to fines, forfeiture of pay, allotments or
insurance payments:
Given to association with, or a victim of, immoral women;
Needed at home due to financial trouble or serious illness of fam-
ily, or desirous of marrying;
Chronic wanderers.
It will be seen that the majority of these individual troubles are
not remediable by the organization commander. Such defects should
have been discovered by the Recruiting Service by complete mental,
moral and physical examination. Nevertheless, it is believed that these
defectives should be discovered and especially handled by the organiza-
tion commander.
6. That desertion occurs chiefly from among the young and
uneducated enlisted men may be seen from statistics compiled by Lieu-
tenant R. P. Parsons, U. S. Navy, at the U. S. Detention Camp, Deer
Island, Mass., where more than 2,500 deserters from the Navy were
kept awaiting trial and sentence, or serving probationary periods, dur-
ing the year ending April, 1919.
Lieutenant Parsons found that deserters from the Navy are chiefly
from among the men of least education. It was found that 50 per cent
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of the deserters were men who had not finished the seventh year of
grammar school, whereas in the Navy at large but 23 per cent are men
who have not finished the same year of school. It was further found
that but 19 per cent of the deserters had attended high school, whereas
in the Navy at large there are 43 per cent who have attended high
school. Sixteen men of the one thousand deserters had attended col-
lege, and 42 men in each one thousand of the Navy at large had
attended college.
It was found that up to and including the age of 19 years there
was a great percentage in favor of deserters. In other words, young
men desert more than men of a mature age. It is found further that
43 per cent of the deserters are nineteen years of age or less, whereas
in the Navy at large there are but 21 per cent, or less than half the
number of the same age.
7. In the study of conditions within the' organization or condi-
tions at the station which may be the cause of desertion, the following
are suggested:
Are recruits "eased" and not "broken" in?
Are the promises of the Recruiting Officers being kept?
Are the barracks made comfortable and kept clean?
Are messes run efficiently with properly cooked food?
Is the uniform properly fitted and are provisions made for clean-
ing and pressing the uniform?
Is punishment administered with undue strictness or with too
much leniency?
Is the pass and furlough privilege as lenient as possible?
Are men properly punished for absence without leave?
Is every opportunity offered for visits to the nearby city or town
without necessitating absence without leave?-
Is hunting, fishing and outdoor recreation encouraged?
Is too much time being given to study?
Is military drill and discipline being sacrificed for educational
training?
Is the proper amount of entertainment being furnished?
Is the consequence of desertion carefully explained to those who
are ignorant and slow in understanding?
Are all possible quarters provided for the families of enlisted
men?
Is the social status of the enlisted man kept up both at the station
and in the nearby civil community?
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Is the amount of guard and fatigue excessive for the size of the
command?
Are drills, encampments and maneuvers held with proper regard
to the climate?
Are enlisted men required to work with civilian laborers, doing
the same class of work at less pay?
Are intoxicants or drugs easily obtainable?
Are any other conditions allowed to continue which cause dis-
satisfaction with the command or station, which could be
corrected locally or by higher authority?
It will be seen that this list includes factors which are within the
power of organization commander to correct. The proper attention
to these factors results in the "efficient administration" of a command.
8. Some of the external conditions which may be expected to
influence the amount of desertion are enumerated as follows:
National prosperity, ease of obtaining employment;
High rate of civil pay as compared with army pay;
General unrest throughout the country;
Labor unrest, anti-recruiting propaganda;
Proximity of war;
Civil attitude toward deserters from the army;
The attitude of the civilian toward the uniform;
Political policy negative concerning the army;
Prohibition.
Although these factors are generally without the power of an
organization commander to correct, it is believed that when one or
more of these conditions exist it becomes the duty of the organization
commander to increase the attractiveness of service in his organiza-
tion. By such measures the "pull inward" may be increased to offset
the increasing "pull outward."
9. In many cases it is believed that fancied wrongs or over-
estimated troubles have caused desertion or, in some cases, have caused
absence without leave which resulted in desertion, which could have
been remedied by financial assistance from the Red Cross or proper
handling by advice or information of the organization commander.
Such conditions should be sought out by the organization commander
and corrected. Tnder this heading comes:
Poverty of the family or dependents;
Serious illness of the parents or wife;
Wife expecting birth of child;
Failure of allotment or war risk insurance payments;
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Mishandling of men by officers or non-commissioned officers;
Dissatisfaction with medical treatment;
Failure to obtain transfer, discharge or furlough;
Unpopularity with associates;
Belief in unfairness.
10. It is believed that the imp6rtance of the early detection of
causes of discontent cannot be overestimated. While it may seem
almost impossible to locate all the causes of discontent, nevertheless it
is for this purpose that the Morale Organization of a command exists.
The use of the Morale Organization, to the determination of all causes
of loss in morale, should result in the tabulation of the causes of dis-
content of each individual as well as of the whole command.
11. In many organizations there will be found men who are not
satisfied with conditions and who intend to desert when the opportu-
nity arises. Very often the associates of these "potential deserters"
will know of this desire to desert. It is considered of great importance
to locate. these "potential deserters" and to remove, if possible, the
definite cause of dissatisfaction. It will be found that often the remedy
will be found in a change of station or organization or the change in
the nature of duty to that of more responsibility. It should be borne
in mind that the saving of a potential deserter to the service is worth
more than the recruiting of a new man to fill his place after desertion.
The loss to the service of a deserter includes the time and expense of
training, the reward for apprehension, the time and expense of Court-
Martial, the time and expense of the post guard, the maintenance
cost of the military prison, and the time and expense of recruiting a
man to replace the deserter.
12. Reports of Morale Officers indicate that in many cases it will
be found that there is a marked difference in the amount of desertion
from different organizations of the same command at the same station.
Often these organizations will be regiments of the same troops. Under
such conditions, it is believed that prompt steps should be taken to
determine the particular cause of discontent in the organization show-
ing the high rate of desertion, and, failing to determine the cause, .it is
believed that transfers of officers and non-commissioned officers from
one organization to the other should be made.
13. The better education of the general public in respect to the
appreciation of desertion as reprehensible and an offense is important.
